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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization with
nearly forty million members, including members in
each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
AARP works to foster the health and economic security
of individuals as they age. To that end, AARP supports
efforts at the state and national level to ensure access
to safe and effective health products. AARP is greatly
concerned about the safety of prescription drugs
because older people disproportionately use them.
AARP supports laws and public policies designed to
protect its members’ rights and to preserve the
availability of legal redress when AARP members are
harmed in the marketplace through no fault of their
own.

AARP has a significant interest in this case. The
issue before the Court directly affects the ability of
AARP’s members in Michigan to seek redress when
injured by dangerous pharmaceutical products that
were approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), or remained on the market, notwithstanding
the fact that the manufacturer intentionally violated
FDA requirements.

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States, no counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
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More broadly, the Court’s resolution of the
preemption question in this case may have repercussions in any case in which plaintiffs seek to make out
common law tort or negligence per se claims by
demonstrating that a drug’s manufacturer intentionally violated federal statutory or regulatory requirements. Petitioners and their amici seek to forbid tort
plaintiffs from relying on evidence that drug companies
intentionally failed to submit required data, or
deliberately misrepresented safety data, to the, FDA.
They contend that permitting plaintiffs to rely on such
a showing might undermine FDA enforcement efforts.
History, of course, refutes that argument. State law
tort claims founded on violations of federal law have
been standard fare for decades, with no evidence of any
impairment to the FDA. Limiting the right to recover
for injuries caused by the intentional misconduct of
drug companies, by barring plaintiffs from showing
that their injuries resulted from the companies’
deliberate failure to comply with federal standards,
would deprive AARP members of the remedy
historically guaranteed to them by common law. For
these reasons, AARP has a strong interest in this case
and it can offer a different perspective on the issues
before the Court than those presented by the parties.
STATEMENT
1. Background
This case was dismissed by the district court on
petitioners’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. This statement is based on publicly
available evidence that the plaintiffs would likely offer
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to the trier of fact on remand. See generally Desiano
v. Warner-Lambert, 326 F.3d 339, 341-43 (2d Cir.
2003); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61,
63-64 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Rezulin is a prescription
drug that was approved by the FDA in January 1997
for the treatment of Type-2 diabetes, and then
marketed and sold by Warner-Lambert between March
1997 and March 2000. Rezulin’s brief, three-year
tenure on the market was marred by increasingly dire
concerns over Rezulin’s liver toxicity. Indeed, five
times during those three years the FDA pushed
Warner-Lambert to make significant modifications to
Rezulin’s label and prescribing information to require
increasingly rigorous monitoring of patients’ liver
functions, reflecting the agency’s growing concern
about the dangers posed by the drug. See id.; see also
Willman, The Rise and Fall of the Killer Drug Rezulin,
L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2000, at A1 (hereinafter "Willman,
The Rise and Fall").2 Finally, in March 2000, at the
FDA’s request, Warner-Lambert withdrew Rezulin
from the market. See Press Release, FDA, Rezulin to
Be Withdrawn from the Market (March 21, 2000),
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
NEWS/NEW00721.html.

2 The FDA has only recently been given authority to
mandate labeling changes. See Pub. L. 110-85, § 901 121 Stat.
823 (Sept. 27, 2007) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(0)(4)).
During the time Rezulin was on the market, the FDA had to
negotiate with drug companies over the contents of labeling and
drug warnings. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Drug Safety:
Improvement Needed in FDA’s Postmarket Decision-making and
Oversight Process 10 (2006) (GAO-06-402) (hereinafter"GAO Drug
Safety Report").
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There is also evidence suggesting that WarnerLambert intentionally withheld information from, and
misrepresented data to, the FDA in an effort to
downplay evidence of Rezulin’s liver toxicity. In re
Rezulin Prods. Liab. Lit~g., 210 F.R.D. at 63-64 & n.6
Warner-Lambert did so initially to obtain FDA
approval for Rezulin and thereafter to keep Rezulin on
the market. See id.; see also Whitcomb & Watkins,
Hepatic Dysfunction Associated with Troglitazone, 338
New Eng. J. Med. 916 (1998). Warner-Lambert also
resisted, for more than six months, the FDA’s request
that it cease marketing Rezulin as a stand-alone drug.
See Willman, ’~Fast-Track" Drug to Treat D~abetes T~ed
to 33 Deaths, L.A. Times, Dec. 7. 1998, at 1.
Throughout the three year period Rezulin was ,on the
market, Warner-Lambert continually touted Rezulin’s
safety and denied the mounting evidence of its risks.
Desiano, 326 F.3d at 342-43. Rezulin was responsible
for ninety-four reported cases of liver failure, including
sixty.six deaths.3 Willman, Hidden Risks, Legal
Truths: Warner-Lambert Won Approval For RezuIin
After Masking The Scope Of Liver Injuries In C~.inical
Studies, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 1.
2. Proceedings Below
The named plaintiff in this case, Kimberly Kent, is
a resident of Michigan and the daughter of Virginia
Kent, who died at age 62 from acute liver failure after

3 This figure is based on cases voluntarily reported to the
FDA. Experts estimate that the actual number of liver failures
and deaths may be as high as ten times this amount. Willman,
The Rise and Fall; Nick Anderson, Rezulin’s Swift Approval, Slow
Removal Raise Issues, L.A. Times, March 23, 2000, at A1.

taking Rezulin. Individually, and as a class
representative, Ms. Kent sued Warner-Lambert,
alleging common law claims, including breach of
implied and expressed warranties, negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence per se, fraud,
defective design, defective manufacturing, and loss of
consortium. Kent was filed in federal court in
Michigan and was transferred by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The
District Court granted Warner-Lambert’s motion for a
judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the claims of
Ms. Kent and other plaintiffs who had alleged that
they or their loved ones sustained serious liver damage
as a result of Rezulin.
The Second Circuit reversed. Desiano v. WarnerLambert, 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). The court held
that, under Michigan law, Ms. Kent’s claims "depend
primarily on traditional and preexisting tort sources,
not at all on a ’fraud-on-the-FDA’ cause of action
created by state law, and only incidentally on evidence
of such fraud." Id. at 98. The court decided that this
distinguished the case from Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). Id.
3. The Michigan Statute
Prior to 1995, Michigan law provided that, in a
product liability action brought against a drug
company, "compliance with governmental and
industrial standards is admissible as evidence but is
not [a] conclusive" defense. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Mich. 1982). In 1995, the
Michigan legislature passed an amendment to the law

to provide a company a complete affirmative defense
when, but only when, the company proves that both
the drug and its labeling comply with FDA requirements. Taylor v. SmithkIine Beecham Corp., 658
N.W.2d 127, 134 (Mich. 2003).
The relevant section of the statute provides:
In a product liability action against a
manufacturer or seller, a product that is a drug
is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and
the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the
drug was approved for safety and efficacy by the
[FDA], and the drug and its labeling were in
compliance with the [FDA’s] approval at the
time the drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5). The statute further
provides that, even if a company makes the threshold
showing for a regulatory compliance defense, the
defense is nonetheless forfeited if:
[T]he defendant at any time before the event
that allegedly caused the injury (a)
[i]ntentionally withholds from or misrepresents
to the [FDA] information concerning the drug
that is required to be submitted under the food,
drug, and cosmetic act.., and the drug would
not have been approved, or the [FDA] would
have withdrawn approval for the drug ff the
information were accurately submitted .... [or]
¯ . . (b) [it] [m]akes an illegal payment to an
official or employee of the United States [FDA]

for the purpose of securing or maintaining
approval of the drug.
do

Petitioners contend that they have no affirmative
duty to prove that Rezulin and its labeling were, in
fact, in compliance with FDA requirements, beyond
simply producing an FDA approval letter and
submitting a declaration from a company official
claiming that the company complied with applicable
FDA requirements. Petitioners further claim that
subsection (a), which denies companies a regulatory
compliance defense if they have not been forthcoming
with the FDA, is preempted and must be severed from
the remainder of the statute because it requires proof
of fraud on the FDA. As a result, petitioners ask this
Court to rewrite Michigan law to provide them and
other drug companies complete immunity from tort
liability even if they intentionally disregard FDA
requirements by withholding or misrepresenting
health and safety data, even if the data would have
been material to the FDA’s approval, and, if one takes
petitioners’ argument to its logical conclusion, even if
they make illegal payments to FDA officials.
4. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
requires companies seeking to obtain the FDA’s
approval to market a new drug to submit a "new drug
application" containing all information bearing on the
drug’s safety and effectiveness, including the results of
animal testing and pharmacological studies, as well as
full reports of the clinical trials performed on human

8
subjects. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b); 21 C.F.R. P~rt 314.
The FDA "determine[s] the kind and quantity of
[additional] data an applicant must provide for a
particular drug to meet the statutory standards." 21
C.F.R. § 314.105(c). The FDA may approve a new drug
only if it determines that the drug is "safe and
effective" for its intended uses and that its labeling is
not "false or misleading." 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1)-(2),
355(b)-(d).4
Approval does not end a company’s reporting
obligations; on an ongoing basis, companies must
provide the FDA with records "relating to clinical
experience" and adverse reactions, t’fie comprehensive
annual reports, and permit the FDA to review their
business records. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(k), 374; 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.80, 314.81. It is unlawful to withhold or
intentionally misrepresent health and safety
information submitted to the FDA. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001; 21 U.S.C. §§ 307b(a)(1), (a)(4); 355(b), (k). And
the FDCA is quite clear that the Secretary "shall’:’ deny
or withdraw approval of a drug if "the application
contains any untrue statement of material fact." 21
U.S.C. § 355(e)(5); see also id. § 355(j)(3)(K).
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
AARP files this brief as amicus curiae to make three
points that may not stand out in respondents’ more
comprehensive treatment of the issues:

See also http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications
/default.htm (describing the drug approval process).
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First, the claims of Ms. Kent and the other
respondents are garden-variety common law tort
claims that have been raised against drug companies
for decades. See generally Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); see also David A.
Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of
the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims,
96 Geo. L.J. 461 (2008). At no point has this or any
other appellate court held that federal law preempts
traditional common law claims involving FDAapproved drugs.~ Given the absence of an express
preemption provision in the FDCA, and Congress’
longstanding awareness of products liability litigation
against drug companies, this is unsurprising. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 161-67 (1989). The fact that Michigan
provides a regulatory compliance defense that is
stronger than most other states’ does not change the
nature of the plaintiffs’ claim in this case. For this
reason, the Court’s ruling in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’
Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), setting aside a
novel"fraud-on-the-FDA" claim on conflict preemption
grounds, has no bearing here.
Second, to shoehorn this case into Buckman’s mold,
petitioners and their amici rewrite Michigan law to
reverse both the order and the burden of proof
established by the Michigan statute. The point of the

5 The Court has been asked to grant review in Wyeth v.
Levine, petition for cert. pending, No. 06-1249 (filed Mar. 12,
2007), to decide whether state tort failure-to-warn claims are
preempted by virtue of FDA-approved labeling, where the drug
company can show that its drug was labeled in compliance with
FDA standards.
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Michigan law is to give companies that play by the
rules the benefit of a complete regulatory compliance
defense that is generally unavailable under common
law. But the statute does not seek to extend liability
protection to companies that play fast and loos~e with
FDA requirements. For that reason, the statute
requires a company claiming a regulatory compliance
defense to show that it "properly obtained FDA
approval." Taylor, 658 N.W.2d at 134 (emphasis
added). The statute places the initial burden .on the
company to prove, not simply allege, that the drug and
its label in fact "were in compliance with" FDA
approval requirements when the drug let~ the
company’s hands. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5)
(emphasis added). Companies that intentionally
withhold or deliberately misrepresent vital safety
information required by the FDA cannot establish
compliance with FDA requirements, see 21 U.S.C. §§
307b(a)(1), (a)(4), 355(b), (e)(5), (j)(3)(K), (k), and
therefore cannot make the threshold showing required
by Michigan law.
To be sure, the Michigan statute goes on to provide
that, even if a company satisfies the threshold
requirement of showing regulatory compliance, the
defense is nonetheless unavailable if the company
intentionally withholds or misrepresents data to the
FDA and the drug would not have been approved, or
the FDA would have withdrawn approval, if accurate
information were submitted. Mich. Comp. Laws §
600.2946(5)(a). In other words, the defense is
unavailable if the company makes a material misrepresentation to, or withholds material information .from,
the FDA. That approach appears to mirror the one
established in the FDCA, which authorizes civil
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penalties for such conduct and directs the FDA to deny
or withdraw its approval of a drug where the sponsor
has made an "untrue statement of material fact." See
21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(5); see also id. § 355(j)(3)(K). As
explained below, subsection (a) is not preempted under
Buckman because courts can determine a company’s
liability without the FDA’s participation and because
a determination that a company violated subsection (a)
would not implicate, let alone interfere with, the FDA’s
enforcement or regulatory prerogatives.
Third, if the Court disagrees and finds subsection
(a) preempted, then it must remand this case for
resolution of the thorny severability question that such
a ruling would pose. Given the clear goal of the
Michigan legislature to provide broader but not
unlimited liability protection to drug companies,
simply severing subsection (a) of Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2946(5) from the remainder of the statute would
turn the Michigan law on its head. Such a ruling
would confer blanket immunity on a drug company
even though it intentionally withheld or distorted
material information to the FDA, even though truthful
information would have led the FDA to withdraw the
drug’s approval, and presumably even if the company
made illegal payments to FDA officials. Such a result
cannot be squared with the evident purpose of the
Michigan legislature to give liability protection only to
those companies that "properly obtained FDA
approval." Taylor, 658 N.W.2d at 134. Therefore, if
this Court holds that any portion of Mich. Comp. Law
§ 600.2956(5)(a) is preempted, the case should be
remanded to the Second Circuit with directions to
undertake further proceedings to address severability.
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ARGUMENT
I. Buckman Does Not Preempt The Traditional
Common Law Claims At Issue Here.
In Buckman, this Court addressed a narrow legal
question based on an unusual set of circumstances.
The defendant, Buckman, was a consultant hired by
AcroMed to help it obtain FDA approval for orthopedic
bone screws. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343. The plaintiffs
were individuals claiming injuries caused by the bone
screws. Id. They successfully asserted state tort
claims against AcroMed. However, the plaintiffs had
no traditional theory of liability against Buckman
because, as a consultant, Buckman had no contact with
patients or doctors and was not involved i~a the
manufacture or sale of the screws.
Undeterred, the plaintiffs advanced a novel "fraudon-the-FDA claim," which premised liability on the
theory that Buckman had defrauded the FDA. The
Court rejected this theory, holding that such claims
"conflict with, and are therefore impliedly preempted
by," the FDCA. Id. at 347. The Court observed that
the plaintiffs’ claim did not "relyD on traditional state
tort law which had predated the federal enactments in
question," that their "claimD exist[ed] solely by virtue
of the FDCA disclosure requirements," and that "the
existence of these federal enactments [was] a critical
element in their case." Id. at 353.
In contrast, the claims at issue here--common law
tort claims--are premised on traditional tort duties
product manufacturers owe to Michigan consumers.
See Desiano, 467 F.3d at 88, 94-95. None of the claims
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rely on the existence of FDCA disclosure requirements
or other federal laws. And nothing in Buckman
suggests that traditional common law claims are
preempted. To the contrary, the Buckman Court found
that the ordinary presumption against preemption did
not apply in that case because the claim for relief at
issue did not arise under common law, but in fact
derived from the FDCA itself. Buckman, 531 U.S. at
347. The Court ruled that policing fraud against the
FDA was a job for the FDA to handle. Id. at 348. But
that logic has no bearing in this case, which concerns
the common law duties that drug companies owe
consumers. The job of compensating people injured
through the fault of others has historically been the
exclusive province of state tort law. The Kent
respondents have invoked common law claims to
remedy wrongdoing by Warner-Lambert against
themselves and their loved ones who were killed or
seriously injured by Rezulin. Because these claim
arise under conventional state tort law, Buckman is
not controlling. See id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (invoking presumption
against preemption to preserve common law claims).
II. Subsection (a) Is Not Preempted.
Petitioners concentrate their fire on subsection (a)
of Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5), as if it is the
keystone of the statute. But that reading of Michigan
law is plainly wrong. The statute begins by offering
drug companies expanded protection from tort liability
where the company can show that it dutifully complied
with FDA requirements. As the Michigan Supreme
Court has observed, "the [Michigan] Legislature has
determined that a drug manufacturer or seller that has
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properly obtained FDA approval of a drug product has
acted sufficiently prudently so that no tort liability
may lie." Taylor, 658 N.W.2d at 134 (emphasis added).
Thus, to make out a regulatory compliance defense
under Michigan law, the initial burden falls on
Warner-Lambert to prove not just that it obtained FDA
approval, but that it "properly" obtained FDA approval
and sold Rezulin "in compliance with FDA approval"
requirements. Id. (emphasis added); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.2946(5). The statute therefore requires
something more from a drug company than simply
producing an FDA approval letter and a self-serving
declaration from a company official asserting that the
company has fully complied with FDA requirements.
The statute, in the words of Taylor, requires the
company to show that it has "properly" obtained. FDA
approval. To make that showing, the company would
be required either to demonstrate that it did not
withhold or distort information that may have been
material to the FDA’s approval decision, or, at the very
least, to refute plaintiffs’ evidence that the company
engaged in wrongdoing. Indeed, that is the ordinary
allocation of the burden of proof in cases in which drug
companies seek to take advantage of a regulatory
compliance defense. See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing
Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049 (2000).
Under this conventional reading of Michigan law,
evidence that Warner-Lambert intentionally withheld
or misrepresented required information is relevant to,
and would refute, Warner-Lambert’s claim of compliance. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (e)(5), (j)(3)(K), (k).
For this reason, the linchpin of the statute is the
burden it places on drug companies to establish all of
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the elements of a traditional regulatory compliance
defense; only if a company does so is it eligible for the
complete defense offered by Michigan law. Petitioners
and their amici would have the Court simply skip over
this crucial step of the analysis, but this step is plainly
compelled by Michigan law.6
Petitioners ask the Court to bypass the threshold
test under Michigan law and go immediately to the
second step in the statute, which functions as a
failsafe. This part of the statute disqualifies a
company for a regulatory compliance defense if the
company (a) withheld information from, or misrepresented information to, the FDA that was material to
the FDA’s approval process, or (b) made illegal
payments to FDA officials. Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2946(5)(a)&(b).7 Petitioners claim that sub-

6 This reading of the statute, which is compelled by
Taylor, suggests that consideration of the issue presented in this
case is premature. Given the district court’s dismissal of the case
on Rule 12(c) grounds, and the Second Circuit’s reversal of that
ruling, there has been no opportunity for the plaintiffs to develop
facts relevant to whether Warner-Lambert intentionally withheld
records from the FDA that it was required to submit or
misrepresented facts to the agency. If there is evidence that
Warner-Lambert used improper means to obtain FDA approval,
or to keep Rezulin on the market, then the company’s effort to
take advantage of Michigan’s complete regulatory compliance
defense would fail at the threshold, see Taylor, 658 N.W.2d at 134,
and the preemption question presented in this case would not
arise. For that reason, the Court might want to consider whether
the writ was improvidently granted or whether the case should be
remanded for a more thorough evaluation of this threshold
question under a proper reading of Michigan law.
While petitioners’ reluctance to address subsection (b)
(continued...)
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section (a) amounts to a requirement that the pl:aintiff
prove "fraud-on-the-FDA" to make out their common
law claims, and thus their claims are preempted under
Buckman.
This argument is flawed. Buckman’s core holding
is that the FDA must be given breathing room to take
measures to safeguard itself against fraud. Judicial
intervention might interfere with that interest.. But
subsection (a) does not implicate that concern.
Enforcement of subsection (a) neither requires the
FDA’s participation nor interferes with FDA e~Lforcement or regulatory prerogatives.
Nothing in the Michigan statute calls on courts to
second-guess FDA regulatory or enforcement decisions.
There is a long history of products liability litigation
against the drug industry based on claims t:hat a
company made misrepresentations to or withheld
material information from the FDA.s That litigation

7(...continued)
may be understandable, the provision cannot simply be ignored.
Under the logic of petitioners’ argument, a claim under subsection
(b) would be preempted as well, since the FDA can be expected to
police instances of bribery as vigorously as instances offrau,d. But
such a conclusion would require the wholesale revislion of
Michigan law, which plainly sought to deny liability protection to
companies that bribe FDA officials.
See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 718
F.2d 553,559-62 (3d Cir. 1983) (failure to submit adverse reaction
reports); Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir.
1979) (failure to adequately warn of drug’s risk); Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure to
seek FDA approval for new use of drug); Toole v. Richardson(continued...)
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has proceeded in both federal and state courts for
decades with no claim that it has interfered with the
FDA’s ability to enforce the law. There is no reason
why now, all of a sudden, that litigation threatens the
FDA’s ability to do its job.
The structure of the Michigan statute serves as a
safeguard against interference with the FDA. The
statute places the initial burden on the company to
prove its regulatory compliance defense. The evidence
needed to substantiate the company’s claim would
come from the company’s own files--not from the FDA.
And in cases like this one, where the heart of the
plaintiffs’ claim is that the petitioners withheld
information from and misrepresented data to the FDA,
those facts are objective ones that can be established,
as they are every day in ordinary tort litigation, on the
bases of the company’s records and expert evaluation
of them, without the FDA’s involvement.9 See supra
note 8.

s(...continued)
60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Cal. App. 1967) (submission of
false and misleading information to the FDA); Orthopedic Equip.
Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) (sale of
misbranded medical device); see also Bristol-Myers v. Gonzales,
561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978) (failure to adequately warn of drug’s
risk, where company knew of risk before it alerted the FDA);
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973) (failure to
adequately warn of drug’s risk); Parke-Davis and Co. v. Stromsodt,
411 F.2d 1390, 1402 (Sth Cir. 1969) (failure to adequately warn of
drug’s risk and inadequate testing of drug).
Merrell, Inc.,

9 The FDA has long and generally successfully resisted
efforts by parties to private litigation to force the agency to
participate. See 21 C.F.I~. § 20.1; see also In re David A. Kessler,
100 F.3d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Nor is there force to petitioners’ argument that
litigating over a subsection (a) claim would somehow
enmesh the FDA in private tort litigation. Petitioners
argue that the language in subsection (a) requires a
showing that the FDA found fraud or would have
denied or withdrawn approval if the information had
been accurately submitted. But that overstates the
burden imposed by the Michigan statute, which does
not use the word fraud. In fact, the language of the
Michigan statute, as a practical matter, mirrors f;~deral
law. Under the FDCA, the FDA "shall" deny or
withdraw approval of a drug if "the apphcation
contains any untrue statement of material fact." 21
U.S.C. § 355(e)(5); see also § 355(j)(3)(K). Under
Michigan law, courts shall deny companies a
regulatory compliance defense if they have omitted or
distorted information that would affect an FDA
approval decision. Thus, the question under Michigan
law distills to whether the company’s omission or
distortion of information was "material." Questions of
materiality are generally the province of courts, and
courts routinely make materiality decisions
notwithstanding the fact that they may also be made
by agencies that have concurrent enforcement
authority.1° There is no reason why Michigan courts,

lo See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (determination of materiality in
securities case made by courts, not just the Securities and
Exchange Commission); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (determination of materia:Lity of
adverse employment action taken allegedly in retahation for
exercising protected rights made by courts and not just the :Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission); see also Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (question of materiality for the courts
(continued...)
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or federal courts applying Michigan law, cannot reach
decisions about materiality without the FDA’s
involvement.
It also bears emphasis that courts will need to reach
the questions posed by Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2946(5)(a), (b) only in the rarest cases. As noted
above, the statute places an initial, affirmative duty on
the company to prove all elements of regulatory
compliance, and evidence of material information
withheld, or material information misrepresented,
would negate such a defense. Subsections (a) and (b)
deny a defense to companies that might satisfy the
basic requirements for the regulatory compliance
defense but have nonetheless engaged in serious and
disqualifying misconduct. But the inquiry called for
under subsection (a) is no different than the inquiry
courts will have to make in assessing the evidence
produced to support or rebut the company’s regulatory
compliance defense: just as material omissions and
misstatements would refute a company’s claim to a
regulatory compliance defense, so too would they
disqualify a company under subsection (a). There is no
reason why evidence the company could use to
establish the regulatory compliance defense it seeks
under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5) is somehow
tainted if used by the plaintiff to disqualify the
company from the defense under subsection (a).
Petitioners offer no explanation as to why their use of

10(...continued)
under tax fraud statute); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (courts
determine whether a fact in genuine dispute is "materiar’ in
deciding summary judgment motions). See generally KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)).
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evidence to support a regulatory compliance defense
raises no preemption concerns while respondents’ use
of similar evidence to rebut the company’s defense is
preempted.
There are two additional concerns raised by the
Buckman Court that further undercut petitioners’
claims. First, the Buckman Court worried[ that
expanding liability by permitting novel claims like the
fraud-on-the-FDA claim asserted by the Buckman
plaintiffs might discourage the development of beneficial, but potentially risky, new products. Buci~man,
531 U.S. at 350-51. This concern has no force here.
The Michigan statute limits traditional common law
liability; it does not create a new cause of action or
expand liability under an existing cause of action. See
Taylor, 658 N.W.2d at 131; see also Desiano, 46~1 F.3d
at 94-95.
Second, the Buckman Court was concerned that
expanding potential tort liability might create an
"incentive for drug companies to submit a deluge of
information that the [FDA] neither wants nor needs."
Id. at 351. At least with the FDA’s regulation of drugs,
in contrast to the regulation of medical devices
involved in Buckman, this concern is misplaced. It is
hard to imagine what information a drug company
might have that even tangentially relates to the safety
of the drug that the company is not already required to
submit to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.11

n FDA regulations are comprehensive, leaving no room
for an applicant to omit information that might be relevant to the
drug’s approval. Among other things, the FDA requires a
(continued...)
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Finally, petitioners’ reading of subsection (a) of the
Michigan statute as requiring a formal FDA finding of
fraud or decision to withdraw approval for a drug on
the basis of safety concerns would render the provision
a dead letter. Neither petitioners nor their amici
(including the United States) can cite a single instance
in which the FDA took either measure. Nor can they
point to an example where the FDA, once it took
enforcement action, went on to declare what impact, if
any, the misconduct had on its approval determination.
Petitioners’ silence is unsurprising. The GAO
reports that, "[s]ince 2000 there have been 10 drug
withdrawals for safety reasons, and in all of these
cases the drug’s sponsor voluntarily removed the drug
from the market." GAO Safety Report, supra note 2, at
10. The GAO goes on to note that the "FDA does not
have explicit authority to require that drug sponsors
take other safety actions," but when the FDA identifies
a problem, "sponsors generally negotiate with the FDA
to avoid other regulatory action." Id. And the FDA’s
own Science Advisory Board reports that the FDA has
all but stopped bringing enforcement cases against
manufacturers of approved drugs.12 Thus, to find that
l~(...continued)
company to submit, as a precondition to approval, an "integrated
summary of all available information about the safety of a drug
product .... " 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vi)(a) (emphasis added);
see also § 314.80 (spelling out comprehensive reporting
requirements for drugs post-approval).
13 FDA Science Board, Report of the Subcommittee on
Science and Technology, FDA Science and Mission at Risk (Nov.
2007), available at http:llwww.fda.govlohrmsldocketslac]07!
briefing12007-4329b_02_00_index.html. The decline in enforce(continued...)
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the Michigan legislature intended subsection (a) to
require formal FDA action would be to ascribe a
singularly irrational intent on its part: namely, that it
made a statutory trigger contingent on FDA action the
agency rarely, if ever, takes.
III. The Court Should Remand The Severability
Question.
The ruling below is correct and should be affirmed.
If this Court disagrees, the case must be remanded for
consideration of the severability question--that is,
whether subsection (a) of Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2946(5) is severable from the remainder of the
statute, or whether the statute is invalid m its
entirety. In AARP’s view, there is a serious federalism
problem that runs through this case. The statute at
issue is a Michigan statute, yet because of the routine
removal of cases to federal court, it has not yet been
authoritatively construed by a Michigan court, apart
from the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Taylor
upholding the statute in the face of a challenge to its
constitutionality under the Michigan Constitution.

~2(...continued)
ment activities by the FDA is nothing short of stunning. In. 1991,
1992, and 1993, the agency brought 468 civil seizure actions, 75
criminal injunction cases, and 121 criminal prosecutions; in. 2004,
2005, 2006, and 2007, the agency bought just 53 civil seizure
actions, 57 criminal injunction cases, and zero criminal
prosecutions. FDA Science and Mission at Risk, atAppendix B-22
- B-23. Tellingly, the only FDA enforcement case petitioners or
the United States cites, United States v. Lane Labs, 427 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2005), was not an action to withdraw approval of an
approved drug. It was instead an action for injunctive and equitable relief against the sellers of unapproved drugs, namely shark
cartilage and other products as cures for cancer and HIV infection.
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We urge this Court to reject Warner-Lambert’s
argument that this Court should make the severability
determination on its own and sever just subsection (a)
from the remainder of Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2946(5). For one thing, the severability issue is
not subsumed within the question presented in this
case and therefore is not before the Court. For
another, such a Procrustean approach to severability
would do violence to the Michigan statute’s goal, which
is to provide drug companies that play by the FDA’s
rules a complete regulatory defense, but to withdraw
that defense when companies engage in conduct that
taints the approval process. Severing just the portion
of the statute Warner-Lambert urges would turn a
strong-but-conditional defense into a blanket immunity
and would give protection to drug companies far
beyond that intended by the Michigan legislature. For
this reason, in the event that the Court disagrees with
the Second Circuit, we urge the Court to remand this
case for reconsideration of the severability question.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in respondents’
brief, the judgment below should be affirmed.
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